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ABSTRACT

Entrepreneurs with venture ideas must establish cognitive legitimacy so they can acquire
essential resources needed for survival. We extend the concept of cognitive legitimacy by
developing a model through which entrepreneurs in emerging high growth organizations
attempt to establish and build cognitive legitimacy. This is based on the composition of their
new venture team and advisory board. Novice entrepreneurs can draw on the prestige of their
new venture team and advisory board to enhance perceptions of their emerging
organization’s cognitive legitimacy. Novelty of the venture idea moderates relationships
between both new venture team prestige and advisory board prestige and cognitive
legitimacy; thus entrepreneurs whose emerging organizations rely on highly novel products
or services will likely need to establish higher levels of prestige to create cognitive legitimacy.
Keywords: Legitimacy, prestige, advisory boards
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cognitive legitimacy of their emerging
organization. We focus on these novice
entrepreneurs and on strategies that allow
them to use the prestige of others to
enhance the cognitive legitimacy of their
ventures. Among novice entrepreneurs,
those who pursue competency-destroying
innovation (i.e., highly novel venture ideas)
likely need higher levels of prestige to
create cognitive legitimacy since their novel
ideas make it harder for stakeholders to
place these ventures into a category of
known organizational forms (Aldrich &
Martinez, 2001). Thus, novelty of the
venture idea acts as a moderator, making it
more difficult for novice entrepreneurs with
highly novel ventures to establish cognitive
legitimacy
through
prestige-building
strategies than for novice entrepreneurs
with less novel ventures.

INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurs with a venture idea must
convince others to join them in their pursuit
of opportunities and they need to influence
potential stakeholders’ perceptions of
legitimacy (Certo, 2003; Delmar & Shane,
2004).
Individuals,
groups
and
organizations (i.e., stakeholders) that have
contact with an entrepreneur evaluate the
emerging organization’s purpose and
legitimacy in order to decide whether or not
to become involved with the emerging
organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Legitimacy, defined as a social judgment of
acceptance,
appropriateness
and
desirability, enables entrepreneurs to
acquire resources needed for survival
(Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004;
Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zietz,
2002).
Legitimacy
helps
emerging
organizations overcome their liability of
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) by enhancing
entrepreneurs’ ability to create social ties
and initiate routines to gain resources
(Deeds et al., 2004; Delmar & Shane, 2004;
Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zietz,
2002).

The proposed model explains how novice
entrepreneurs can establish and build the
cognitive legitimacy of their emerging
organizations by “borrowing” prestige (i.e.,
social rank or membership in exclusive
social networks) from their new venture
team (NVT) and advisory board members.
Prestigious affiliations have been shown to
impact IPO valuations, likely because IPO
firms involve a considerable amount of
uncertainty due to their limited track
records and resources (e.g. Pollock, Chen,
Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010; Stuart, Hoang,
& Hybels, 1999). Entrepreneurship research
on prestige-borrowing by IPO firms have
increased our understanding of the benefits
of prestige. But very few startups become
IPO firms and the sources of prestige
available to novice entrepreneurs and
emerging organizations at the earliest stages
of development likely differ from those
accessible to IPO firms. For instance,
statutory boards of directors are typically
not formed until entrepreneurs seek external
financing such as launching an IPO. Early

Entrepreneurship researchers have not fully
explained the possible strategic behaviors
entrepreneurs can take to build cognitive
legitimacy at the earliest stages of a new
venture’s
development.
We
extend
Shepherd and Zacharakis’ (2003) work on
cognitive legitimacy, focusing on the
process by which initial stakeholders form
perceptions of an emerging organization’s
cognitive legitimacy. “The antecedents of
cognitive legitimacy of an organization are
the history and prevalence of its particular
organizational form” (Bitektine, 2011:
p.160).
Novice
entrepreneurs—
entrepreneurs
lacking
prior
startup
experience—do not have a history or a prior
track record that can help establish the
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We begin by defining cognitive legitimacy
relative to other types of legitimacy. Next,
we address the process and challenges
emerging
organizations
face
when
establishing cognitive legitimacy. We
integrate the literature to support the
proposed model and present testable
propositions of how emerging organizations
build cognitive legitimacy by creating
prestigious NVTs and advisory boards. We
explain how novelty of venture ideas
moderates this process. A discussion of the
implications and limitations of the proposed
model completes the paper.

stage emerging organizations more likely
rely on advisory boards rather than statutory
boards of directors, but advisory boards
have received relatively little attention in
the entrepreneurship literature. The model
proposed here extends research on prestige
in IPO firms, focusing on the strategic use
of prestige in advisory boards and new
venture teams to create cognitive legitimacy
(and the impact the novelty of the venture
idea has on this process).
Entrepreneurship researchers tend to view
legitimacy retrospectively while this paper
contributes by adopting a proactive
forward-looking perspective. Survival has
often been used as an indication of
legitimacy but this tells us little about how
emerging organizations establish and build
cognitive legitimacy: it merely shows or
assumes an organization has legitimacy
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). The
perspective adopted here emphasizes how
entrepreneurs in early stage emerging
organizations can take strategic actions such
as selecting prestigious NVT and advisory
board members in order to create and
maintain cognitive legitimacy.

COGNITIVE LEGITIMACY
A review of the legitimacy literature reveals
that although many researchers distinguish
between different types of legitimacy, little
consensus exists regarding the various types
of legitimacy and their scope. However,
most researchers distinguish cognitive
legitimacy from other forms of legitimacy
that fall under the umbrella of sociopolitical
legitimacy (e.g. Suchman, 1995; Hannan &
Freeman, 1986; Aldrich, 1999).
Legitimacy resides in the minds of
observers who may or may not be aware of
how legitimacy affects their decision
making (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). These
observers
appear
to
make
two
fundamentally different types of judgments
when evaluating organizational legitimacy:
cognitive
legitimacy
judgment
and
sociopolitical
legitimacy
judgment
(Bitektine, 2011). A cognitive legitimacy
judgment involves determining whether an
organization exhibits a set of recognizable
characteristics that can be used to classify it
as a member of a certain class of
organizations. A sociopolitical legitimacy
judgment
evaluates
whether
the
organization is socially acceptable (Aldrich,
1999; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine,

We contribute to entrepreneurship research
that examines the sequencing of organizing
activities pursued by founders. We agree
with Delmar and Shane’s (2004) argument
that the sequencing of these activities
matters – founders should initially focus on
activities to obtain cognitive legitimacy
because legitimacy, “is a necessary
precondition to initiating social ties with
stakeholders and obtaining and recombining
resources” (p. 386). We extend this
argument
by
showing
that
the
characteristics of the NVT and advisory
board play an important part in establishing
and building cognitive legitimacy in
emerging organizations.
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cognitive legitimacy in the earliest stages of
emerging
organizations
distinguishes
liability of newness from liability of
smallness. An entrepreneur must establish
cognitive legitimacy to overcome the
emerging organization’s liability of
newness—the lack of structure, policies and
procedures or ways to deal with regular
activities--as well as the disadvantages
faced as a small organization (Stinchcombe,
1965) such as limited resources.

2011; Hannon & Freeman, 1977; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995).
Entrepreneurs in the early stages of forming
a new venture must pay particular attention
to establishing cognitive legitimacy,
showing outsiders that these entrepreneurs
have gone beyond dreaming and talking
about starting businesses to engaging in
startup activities that create new ventures.
As they struggle to overcome the liability of
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and develop
an organization, roles for employees,
procedures for operating and so on, they
must find ways to ensure that their new
ventures look like viable and successful
businesses. This effort to establish cognitive
legitimacy may represent a bigger challenge
for early stage entrepreneurs than creating
sociopolitical legitimacy: society generally
regards profit seeking activities as valid
unless they involve activities prohibited by
law (Aldrich, 1999; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
Delacroix, Swaminathan, & Solt, 1989;
Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2003). This
accounts for the emphasis here on cognitive
legitimacy judgments about emerging
organizations.

Entrepreneurship researchers recognize that
the organizational life cycle needs to
include stages earlier than when the
entrepreneur legally creates the organization
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Clarysse and
Moray (2004) identified two phases that
precede the initial start-up stage used in
most organizational life cycle theories: 1)
the idea phase when the entrepreneur
conceives of a way to address unmet needs
in the market and an organization begins to
emerge; and 2) the pre-startup phase that
evolves from the idea phase when the
entrepreneur makes a decision to form an
organization. At these two early phases, the
organization faces considerable uncertainty
and a lack of awareness by outsiders as the
entrepreneur begins acquiring essential
resources.

Establishing Cognitive Legitimacy with
Prestige
Entrepreneurship researchers have not fully
explained how emerging organizations
build cognitive legitimacy at the earliest
stages of an emerging organization’s
development. Katz & Gartner (1988) stress
the importance of investigating the
processes underlying the transition from
emerging organizations or organizations-increation to existing organizations. New
emerging organizations are not smaller,
incomplete
versions
of
existing
organizations because their organizational
properties are arranged in fundamentally
different ways (Gartner, Bird, & Starr,
1992). The emphasis on how to establish

To establish cognitive legitimacy in an
emerging organization, an entrepreneur
must generate enough knowledge related to
the new venture for its existence to be
taken-for-granted by key stakeholders.
These stakeholders make cognitive
legitimacy judgments involving the
determination of whether the new venture
exhibits a set of recognizable characteristics
that can be used to categorize it as a
member of a certain class of organizations.
Innovator entrepreneurs—those pursuing
highly novel ideas or technologies--likely
face more difficulty in establishing
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cognitive legitimacy than reproducer
entrepreneurs. Innovator entrepreneurs start
organizations
involving
competencedestroying innovations that require new
knowledge, routines, and competencies
(Aldrich & Martinez, 2001). Stakeholders
will likely have more difficulty categorizing
an emerging organization created by an
innovator
entrepreneur
because
its
characteristics are more difficult to classify
and stakeholders may not completely
understand the innovative entrepreneur’s
business idea. Therefore, we focus our
model on explaining the establishment of
cognitive legitimacy judgments in emerging
organizations and pay particular attention to
the challenges faced by innovator
entrepreneurs.

phase of an emerging organization’s life
cycle. An emerging organization typically
begins once an individual or small group of
co-founders decide to pursue a venture idea.
Individuals considering joining the NVT at
this initial stage focus on gathering
information to determine a venture idea’s
viability (Kamm & Nurick, 1993). As the
emerging organization develops, product
knowledge becomes more important,
followed by organizational knowledge
which likely consists of aggregated NVT
knowledge and product knowledge.
Therefore, we argue that establishing
cognitive legitimacy during the idea phase
and pre-startup phase depends mostly on
knowledge regarding the entrepreneur and
the NVT.

Shepherd and Zacharakis (2003) identified
three dimensions of cognitive legitimacy:
product
knowledge,
organization
knowledge
and
management
team
knowledge. The cognitive legitimacy of
emerging organizations can be determined
by measuring the level of knowledge or
information the public holds regarding the
emerging organization. Entrepreneurs with
venture ideas (i.e. individuals in the idea
phase) often begin with little, if any
cognitive legitimacy because stakeholders
have little knowledge and understanding
regarding the emerging organization
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).
These
entrepreneurs need to send signals that link
their emerging organization to categories
familiar to stakeholders (Fischer & Reuber,
2007), reducing uncertainty. Cognitive
legitimacy allows stakeholders to conserve
cognitive resources associated with
organizing and searching for additional
information (Bitektine, 2011; Shepherd &
Zacharakis, 2003).

The task of establishing cognitive
legitimacy is especially difficult for novice
entrepreneurs. A novice entrepreneur
involves someone starting his or her first
venture, whereas a serial entrepreneur has
founded multiple ventures (Baron & Ward,
2004; MacMillan, 1986; Ucbasaran,
Wright, & Westhead, 2003). Serial
entrepreneurs have reputations gained from
their experience with prior ventures and
receive performance-based rewards based
on these reputations. Such reputations can
be used to signal perceived quality when a
new venture lacks other forms of
information on quality (Dimov, Shepherd,
& Sutcliffe, 2007). Reputation and prestige
(also referred to as status) represent
distinctly different constructs and both
serve as a signal of future performance for
stakeholders. Reputation signals the
likelihood of strong future performance
based on past performance in contrast to
status or prestige that results from an
organization’s pattern of social relationships
and the quality of its network partners
(Dimov et al., 2007).

Little product knowledge and organizational
knowledge exist in the idea and pre-startup
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Prestige can be defined as the property of
having status as derived from membership
in elite social circles (D’Aveni, 1990);
defining prestige in terms of status accounts
for why researchers sometimes use the
terms prestige and status interchangeably.
Prestige represents a sociological concept
capturing differences in social rank while
reputation, an economic concept, captures
differences in actual or perceived quality
among organizations (Dimov et al., 2007;
Washington & Zajac, 2005). Reputation
commonly generates performance or meritbased awards earned by and based on past
performance of the firm, whereas status
(i.e., prestige) generates non-performancebased benefits known as privileges -defined as unearned ascriptions of social
rank that are not performance-based
(Washington & Zajac, 2005). Empirical
research supports distinguishing between
prestige (i.e., status) and reputation.
Washington and Zajac (2005) examined the
impact of status and reputation on the
likelihood of being invited to the NCAA
tournament in a current year. Their results
indicate that reputation (a basketball team’s
performance during the year) differs from
status (the university’s history of invitations
to the NCAA postseason tournament).
Teams with a history of being invited to the
tournament (i.e., high status) received
privileges beyond the outcomes predictable
by considering their performance during the
year (i.e., quality or performance-based
rewards associated with reputation). This
shows that prestige differs from reputation.

their reputations (i.e., prior entrepreneurial
experience) may reduce perceived risk
associated with a new startup (March &
Shapira, 1987), likely establishing some
cognitive legitimacy for the emerging
organization. Novice entrepreneurs must
find a way to generate non-performance
based rewards such as by using prestige.
Prestige is not based on prior performance,
so it may exist independently of real quality
(Washington & Zajac, 2005).

Prestige and reputation represent two
different “channels” entrepreneurs can use
to signal quality (Dimov et al., 2007).
Novice and previously unsuccessful
entrepreneurs
differ
from
serial
entrepreneurs as to which “channel” is
available. The model proposed here does
not apply to serial entrepreneurs because

Forming a highly prestigious NVT likely
enhances the cognitive legitimacy of the
emerging organization by increasing the
information available to stakeholders
(Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2003; Suchman,
1995). When NVT members have high
prestige, the perception of status sends a
signal to external stakeholders that evokes

Stakeholders facing uncertainty regarding
the perceived quality of an emerging
organization may rely on prestige of those
associated with the firm (e.g., prestige of
the NVT or advisory board members) as a
surrogate for organizational quality
(Podolny, 1993). Stakeholder decisions to
provide resources to emerging organizations
depend on stakeholders’ ties to individuals
associated with the venture and to the
credentials of the individuals associated
with the venture (Florin, Lubatkin, &
Schulze, 2003). Connecting individuals
with high prestige to the emerging
organization may provide a mechanism for
establishing cognitive legitimacy. We argue
that the prestige of the entrepreneur, new
venture team, and advisory board
communicates information about an
emerging organization, establishing and
building cognitive legitimacy - prestige
generates privileges or unearned ascriptions
of social rank for an emerging organization
that are not based on its historical
performance.
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directors (Mueller, 1988). The increasing
work load and legal liability for directors on
statutory boards of directors since the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley has made
advisory boards much more attractive.
Advisory boards offer a way for emerging
organizations to gain the expertise,
connections and access to resources of
board members without incurring legal
liability. Forming an advisory board instead
of a statutory board offers a way to
eliminate the need for insurance and
encourages reluctant outsiders to participate
(Fox, 1982; Ward & Handy, 1988). The use
of advisory boards has become especially
common in Silicon Valley in the past
couple of decades (Morkel & Posner, 2002).
Emerging organizations typically establish
an advisory board before a statutory board
of directors. Firms often form boards of
directors expressly to satisfy external
financiers who are needed later in the
organization’s existence (Fiegener, Brown,
Dreux & Dennis, 2000). A prestigious
statutory board of directors can build
cognitive legitimacy but at a later stage in
the life cycle of the venture than our model
covers.

consistent and coherent categories for the
emerging organization (Fischer & Reuber,
2007). Entrepreneurs may strategically
select NVT members with high prestige to
provide the emergent firm with more
network ties (Hite & Hesterly, 2001),
recognizing that “both strong and weak ties
are useful and contribute to the emergence
and growth of firms” (Elfring & Hulsink,
2007: 1852). Novice entrepreneurs need to
rely on their social networks and those of
family and friends to identify potential high
prestige NVT members. Entrepreneurs who
establish a low prestige NVT provide
stakeholders with minimal or no
information. Prestige provides stakeholders
with some information regarding the
management team and organization, thereby
increasing cognitive legitimacy. This leads
to the following proposition:
P1: NVT prestige relates positively
to stakeholders’ perceptions of the
emerging organization’s cognitive
legitimacy.
In the idea and pre-startup phases of an
organizational life cycle, entrepreneurs may
choose to form an advisory board. An
advisory board may be defined as a group
of individuals formed to perform service
and resource dependence roles similar to
statutory boards (Daily & Dalton, 1992;
1993; Huse, 1990; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992;
Murray 2003; Whisler, 1988). Although
operating with similar formality and
characteristics of a statutory board of
directors, advisory board members act as
advisors and thus, represent boards that are
characterized as advisory rather than
governing boards (Huse, 2000; Lynall,
Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Whisler, 1988).

Entrepreneurs may “strategically adapt and
align their networks to gain the resources
they need to ensure successful emergence”
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001: 278), including
selecting prestigious advisory board
members. Prior research shows that the
presence of high status partners adds to
perceptions of an emerging organization
(Deutsch & Ross, 2003; Shane & Cable,
2002).
Boards serve a symbolic role
independent of their tangible activities
(Certo, 2003) and social networks.
Advisory board members with high prestige
due to their social capital and human capital
related to areas important to the emerging
organization can signal information to
stakeholders regarding the quality of the

Advisory boards signify voluntary boards
and are not held to the same liability
exposure as corporate or statutory boards of
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A high prestige NVT and a high prestige
advisory board both signal cognitive
legitimacy independently. An emerging
organization may be able to borrow or
“rent” the prestige of their advisory board to
enhance their cognitive legitimacy (Deutsch
& Ross, 2003). The advisory board
therefore could act as a middleman (i.e.,
partial mediator) between the NVT and
potential stakeholders. The presence of both
a high prestige NVT and a high prestige
advisory board will lead to the highest level
of cognitive legitimacy for emerging
organizations. A high prestige NVT
increases cognitive legitimacy directly and
also indirectly through the formation of a
high prestige advisory board. The
combination of a high prestige NVT and a
prestigious advisory board sends signals to
external stakeholders that cue up unified,
coherent and consistent categories about the
attributes of the emerging organization
(Fischer & Reuber, 2007), providing the
highest level of cognitive legitimacy.
Establishing a low prestige NVT has a
definite downside since the entrepreneur
with a low prestige NVT will have
difficulty attracting high prestige members
to the advisory board, resulting in lower
cognitive legitimacy for the emerging
organization. Low prestige conveys little
information to stakeholders facing an
already uncertain situation (the idea and
pre-startup phases).

management
team,
product,
and
organization, thereby increasing the
emerging
organization’s
cognitive
legitimacy. Novice entrepreneurs may use
their social networks and those of family,
relatives, friends and neighbors to identify
and try to attract prestigious advisory board
members; in some cases, entrepreneurs have
even paid prestigious advisory board
members to become involved with their
emerging organizations in an effort to build
cognitive legitimacy. Thus,
P2: Advisory board prestige
relates positively to stakeholders’
perceptions of the emerging
organization’s
cognitive
legitimacy.
Entrepreneurs enhance their ability to
develop an advisory board with high
prestige when the emerging organization
has a highly prestigious NVT. Since most
CEOs rely on their personal networks as the
source for identifying advisory board
members (Murray, 2003), the prestige of the
entrepreneur and other NVT members
likely impacts the emerging organization’s
ability to form a prestigious advisory board.
In addition, prestigious individuals rely on
the presence of other prestigious individuals
to validate their own affiliation with the
organization (Chen, Hambrick, Pollock,
2008; Podolny, 1994). These individuals
prefer to associate with other high prestige
individuals (Podolny, 1994) and avoid
affiliating with individuals or organizations
that could reflect poorly on them (Stuart et
al., 1999). The prestige of the NVT
members sends positive signals to
prospective advisory board members about
the emerging organization. The following
proposition states this relationship:

Highly prestigious NVTs are not expected
to create advisory boards with low prestige
nor are low prestige NVTs expected to be
able to create highly prestigious advisory
boards since both of these scenarios would
contradict
the
literature
supporting
Proposition 3. However, if these scenarios
did occur, the effect would be the same: a
low prestige advisory board weakens the
relationship between the highly prestigious
NVT and cognitive legitimacy; and a

P3: NVT prestige relates positively
to advisory board prestige.
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venture (Kamm & Nurick, 1993), if the
evolving resource needs of the venture
require a shift in the network structure of
the venture (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Hite
& Hesterly, 2001). The entrepreneur and the
first members of the NVT provide early
indications of an emerging organization’s
cognitive legitimacy. Each activity an
entrepreneur undertakes during the idea and
pre-startup phase (such as altering the
venture idea, building the NVT, adding an
advisory board, and changing the
composition of the NVT and advisory
board) has the potential to impact the
cognitive legitimacy of the emerging
organization by providing stakeholders with
new information.

prestigious advisory board would strengthen
the relationship between a low prestige
NVT
and
cognitive
legitimacy.
Additionally, some entrepreneurs may
choose not to form an advisory board. For
example, a highly prestigious NVT may
choose not to form an advisory board. This
choice reduces the information conveyed to
external stakeholders when they are
evaluating the cognitive legitimacy of the
emerging organization. Creating an
advisory board enlarges the social network
and allows individuals from outside the
organization to provide feedback to the
emerging organization (Huse, 1990;
Murray, 2003). Individuals outside of the
organization who sit on the board offer
greater independence and appear to enhance
venture performance (Daily & Dalton,
1993; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000).
Therefore an emerging organization with a
prestigious NVT and no advisory board
results in lower cognitive legitimacy than an
emerging organization with both a high
prestige NVT and advisory board.
Therefore, we propose the following:

New information may transform the
original idea, alter resource requirements or
suggest changes in the composition of the
NVT. This sort of adaptation to new
information may require the removal or
replacement of NVT members in order for
the team to function effectively (Kamm &
Nurick, 1993). The entrepreneur may also
change NVT members in order to extend
the new venture’s social network to gain
greater access to information and resources
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Enlarging the
advisory board or replacing current
members with people possessing greater
prestige and network ties (both strong and
weak ties) can enhance the emerging
organization’s cognitive legitimacy with
certain stakeholders. As an emerging
organization continues to build cognitive
legitimacy, the entrepreneur should find it
easier to recruit and replace individuals in
the NVT and advisory board with others
who have high prestige.

P4: Advisory board prestige
moderates the relationship between
new venture team prestige and
cognitive
legitimacy.
The
relationship between new venture
team prestige and cognitive
legitimacy will be stronger for
emerging organizations with high
advisory board prestige.
Building cognitive legitimacy in emerging
organizations represents a dynamic process.
The venture idea, as well as the composition
of the NVT and advisory board needs to
constantly adapt to meet the changing needs
of the emerging organization. The emerging
organization develops new network ties by
altering the composition of the NVT and
advisory board in the early stages of the

The establishment of a high prestige NVT
and high prestige advisory board has a
lasting effect on the new venture.
Washington and Zajac (2005) explored the
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P5: The process of establishing
cognitive legitimacy is a
reinforcing process: a) the
greater cognitive legitimacy in
time period 2, the greater NVT
prestige and advisory board
prestige in time period 3; b)
the greater NVT prestige in
time period 2, the greater NVT
prestige in time period 3; c)
the greater advisory board
prestige in time period 2, the
greater
advisory
board
prestige in time period 3; d)
the greater advisor board
prestige in time period 2, the
greater NVT prestige in time
period 3.

evolution of status, noting that once initial
status is achieved it tends to be perpetuated.
This likely makes the early establishment of
cognitive legitimacy based on prestige
especially critical for the emerging
organization since it may have long-term
implications for survival and venture
success. Therefore, we expect relationships
among NVT prestige, advisory board
prestige, and cognitive legitimacy to be
reciprocal.
Interacting with highly
prestigious individuals or entities may
generate privileges (explicitly, the unearned
ascription of high social rank) for an
emerging organization, whereas interactions
across low prestige organizations may yield
less favorable perceptions or unearned
ascriptions of low social rank (Washington
& Zajac, 2005).

In addition to characteristics of the NVT
and advisory board members, the process of
establishing and building
cognitive
legitimacy in emerging organizations may
be contingent on characteristics of the
venture idea. The degree of novelty
associated with the venture idea pursued by
an emerging organization has begun
receiving attention from entrepreneurship
researchers as a key contextual variable
(e.g. Amason, Shrader & Tompson, 2006;
Choi, Levesque & Shepherd, 2007). New
ventures pursuing highly novel innovations
appear to require a different mix of strong
and weak ties than those pursing less radical
innovations (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003).

An emerging organization that attracts high
prestige individuals to its NVT at time
period two creates some cognitive
legitimacy that makes it easier to attract
additional prestigious NVT members in
time period three (shown as a feedback loop
from cognitive legitimacy to NVT and
feedback from NVT at time 2 to NVT at
time 3). Similar feedback processes occur
when an emerging organization attracts
high prestige advisory members in time
period two, making it easier to add more
advisory board members with high prestige
in time period three (shown as feedback
loop from cognitive legitimacy to prestige
of advisory board and the feedback loop
from advisory board at time 2 to advisory
board at time 3). Thus, acquiring additional
NVT members and advisory board
members who have high prestige should be
easier as an emerging organization gains
prestigious NVT and advisory board
members and builds cognitive legitimacy.
This results in the following proposition:

The degree of novelty of the venture idea
likely affects the relationships among NVT
prestige, advisory board prestige, and
cognitive legitimacy. Unlike incremental
innovations
which
involve
small
improvements to technology that is
currently available, radical innovations (or
disruptive innovations) involve innovations
that encompass a high degree of new
knowledge (Dewar & Dutton, 1986: 1442).
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been viewed as a viable new product by
businesses providing gas lighting, except
that it was introduced by Thomas Edison
who gave the new idea credibility. An
entrepreneur pursuing a novel idea could
benefit greatly from a similar type of
association with a high prestige individual
on the NVT or advisory board. Less
prestigious individuals likely have great
difficulty convincing people of a highly
novel product’s viability. Thus, the creation
of a prestigious NVT and/or advisory board
will be even more helpful in establishing
cognitive legitimacy when the emerging
organization involves a high novelty
venture idea. We propose the following:

A novel or highly creative product
represents one in which a clear path does
not exist: no one has accomplished this task
before so no heuristic exists for how to do
so (Amabile, 1996). Entrepreneurs with
highly novel venture ideas—those working
in highly uncertain or unknown areas--face
greater challenges in creating cognitive
legitimacy, making prestige of their NVTs
and advisory boards more critical than for
ventures pursuing more imitative ideas.
Emerging
organizations
often
face
substantial resistance when introducing
radical innovations, in part, because many
of them fail. “Like biological mutations,
radical innovations crop up sporadically,
but very few have the qualities that lead to
long-term survival” (Utterback, 1994: 162).
As the novelty of the venture idea increases,
the NVT must spend more time processing
information (Amason et al., 2006) and
communicating explicit knowledge to the
firm’s external stakeholders (Choi et al.,
2007). Entrepreneurs relying on radical
innovations
face
greater
problems
establishing legitimacy and may need to
rely on larger networks of diverse weak ties
whereas ventures using incremental
innovations can rely on close networks of
strong ties (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007). This
suggests that novice entrepreneurs pursuing
radical innovations will likely need to create
and use larger social networks in order to
locate highly prestigious individuals for
their NVTs and advisory boards.

P6: The novelty of venture idea
moderates the relationship between
prestige (both NVT and advisory
board) and cognitive legitimacy.
The relationship between prestige
and cognitive legitimacy will be
stronger
for
emerging
organizations
exploiting
high
novelty venture ideas.
The proposed model (see Figure 1) applies
to high growth emerging organizations prior
to external financing, started by novice
entrepreneurs. Those novice entrepreneurs
who pursue highly innovative ideas will
need greater levels of prestige to establish
cognitive legitimacy.
High growth
emerging organizations are defined as those
emerging organizations “where significant
sales and profit growth are expected to the
extent that it may be possible to attract
venture capital money and/or funds raised
through public or private placement”
(Ronstadt, 1984: 75).
High growth
emerging organizations typically create an
advisory board and obtain external
financing at some point in their
organizational life cycle. Emerging
organizations without the motivation to

Highly novel venture ideas involve products
in which individuals lack a frame of
reference for understanding what the
product is and what benefits it offers above
that of products existing in the marketplace
(Athaide, Meyers, & Wilemon, 1996;
Slater,
1993).
Utterback
(1994)
demonstrates the importance of a
prestigious NVT member with his example
that incandescent lighting might not have

81

Journal of Small Business Strategy

Vol. 23, No. 1
needed by the organization will change as
the new venture moves from the emergent
to the start-up stage.

grow have little need for an advisory board
or external financing. Cognitive legitimacy
issues and the type of social network ties

Figure 1: A Dynamic Model of Establishing Cognitive Legitimacy with Prestigious New
Venture Team and Advisory Board Members.
P5b +

P5a +
New Venture Team
Prestige

P1 +

P3 +
Novelty of
Venture Idea

P4 +

P5d +

P6 +

Cognitive
Legitimacy

P2 +
Advisory Board
Prestige

P5a +

P5c +

not the only factor impacting whether an
emerging organization evolves into a
successful new venture, we believe that it is
a crucial obstacle that innovator
entrepreneurs must deal with to overcome
their liability of newness.

DISCUSSION
This paper represents one of the first
attempts to examine how entrepreneurs
might pursue a strategy of “borrowing”
prestige
to
help
their
emerging
organizations
establish
cognitive
legitimacy. We develop a model that
explains the process of establishing and
building cognitive legitimacy by recruiting
prestigious NVT members and prestigious
advisory board members. High prestige
NVT and advisory board members can also
enhance the cognitive legitimacy of
emerging organizations pursuing highly
novel venture ideas. Although we
acknowledge that cognitive legitimacy is

The proposed model applies to “emerging
organizations”, those at a very early stage of
development when an entrepreneur with a
venture idea begins to form an organization.
We join research that explores actions
entrepreneurs can take to proactively build
legitimacy (e.g., Liao and Gartner, 2007).
We answer the call for research that
explains how theories and models
developed for more established ventures
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For entrepreneurship researchers, we
suggest that the formation of the NVT and
advisory board should be included among
key organizing activities initially pursued
by founders. We focus on how advisory
boards can be utilized in a similar fashion as
NVTs to further aid in the establishment
and building of cognitive legitimacy. There
is a need for research to explore how
advisory boards impact new venture
performance, especially since advisory
boards offer important advantages since
Sarbannes-Oxley. Researchers need to
distinguish advisory boards from boards of
directors -- that entrepreneurs typically
form in a later stage of venture
development.

likely differ when applied to emerging
organizations (Katz & Gartner, 1988). We
expect many concepts examined in more
established organizations are likely to be
even more critical to firm survival and
performance in the earliest stages of an
organization’slife.
Researchers have attempted to measure
legitimacy using indirect measures related
to the source of legitimacy, such as winning
certification tests (Rao, 1994), entering into
alliances (Stuart et al., 1999) and being
mentioned in the press (Deeds et al., 2004).
This practice treats prestige and legitimacy
as identical constructs. We distinguish
legitimacy from its sources (i.e., prestige)
and explain how prestige impacts cognitive
legitimacy in the absence of reputation.
Successful serial entrepreneurs may rely on
their reputations to generate cognitive
legitimacy, but novice entrepreneurs do not
have this advantage. Novice entrepreneurs
need to create sources of information that
help them establish awareness and reduce
uncertainty among stakeholders of the
emerging organization. We argue that key
factors affecting the amount of information
conveyed
to
stakeholders
include
characteristics of the individuals involved
with as well as characteristics of the venture
idea.

Our model stresses the importance of
looking beyond the entrepreneur and
examining the impact of all the individuals
associated with emerging organizations. It
is important to consider what benefits these
individuals
provide
the
emerging
organization beyond advice and expertise.
Scholars suggest that entrepreneurs form
advisory committees (e.g. Timmons &
Spinelli, 2007; Kuratko & Hodgetts, 2004);
however, they do not provide effective
strategies for advisory board member
selection nor explain how advisory boards
may impact survival. We argue that in
addition to the valuable advice advisory
board members play, they can also generate
“privileges”: unearned ascriptions of social
rank that signal cognitive legitimacy.

High levels of prestige have been shown to
decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy
(D’Aveni,
1990)
and
organization
dissolution
(Pennings,
Lee,
Van
Witteloostuijn, 1998), as well as increase
CEO compensation (Belliveau, O’Reilly,
Wade, 1996) in established organizations.
We extend prior research by proposing how
prestige applies in an entrepreneurial
context, and by going beyond the
entrepreneur to include new venture teams
and advisory boards.

While the main focus of this article involves
how
entrepreneurs
of
emerging
organizations can use (high prestige NVT
and advisory board members, our model
also has implications for social network
research in entrepreneurship. Researchers
note that resource needs of new ventures
change during the emergence stage so
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We also expect a moderating relationship
between reputation earned due to prior
success as an entrepreneur and cognitive
legitimacy. In the Bayesian view, priors are
experiential (Norton & Moore, 2006),
which suggests a contextual limitation.
Priors--successful serial entrepreneurs--may
moderate only to the extent that they
capitalize on domain-specific competencies
or start new ventures in the same industry as
their prior successes. Alternatively, priors
could be conceptualized as a source of
cognitive legitimacy rather than a
moderating variable. Very successful serial
entrepreneurs likely benefit from creating a
prestigious NVT and advisory board (due to
the non-performance based rewards prestige
generates in addition to the performance
based rewards their reputation generates).
We do not include successful serial
entrepreneurs in our model but this stage
model affords researchers meaningful
control over the articulated variables.
Theoretical refinement and empirical
examination of this model should increase
our understanding of the process of
establishing cognitive legitimacy.

entrepreneurs likely need ways to alter their
network ties (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Few
researchers have addressed “the actual
function and utility of network ties (Jack,
2005: 1254). We show that entrepreneurs
may assess the potential and realized
benefits of their network ties, adding some
new ties and dropping other ties (Elfring &
Hulsink, 2007): an entrepreneur striving to
increase cognitive legitimacy should add
high prestige NVT and advisory board
members and drop those with low prestige.
The primary objective of this paper is to
suggest a limited-domain theory.
By
design, we advance a formal argument that
considers emerging organizations with little
if any cognitive legitimacy and offer
propositions that suggest strategies,
relationships, and probable outcomes.
However, this theoretical framework
exploring cognitive legitimacy and its
sources is not limited to high tech emerging
organizations. Other examples of high
growth ventures could include new
franchise systems. Although we examine
how the novelty of a venture idea moderates
the relationship between both NVT and
advisory board prestige and the cognitive
legitimacy of the emerging organization,
other factors may also moderate these
relationships. Commitment may have a
moderating effect, and is defined as
behaviors that bind an individual to others
(Stone & Brush, 1996). An advisory board
that is committed to a NVT would likely
enhance its cognitive legitimacy as
compared with an advisory board that does
not exhibit high levels of commitment. Our
model implies that entrepreneurs may focus
on cognitive legitimacy building strategies
at the earliest phases of the nascent venture
and these efforts will assist them in
developing commitment among internal and
external stakeholders (Stone & Brush,
1996).

Researchers need to consider possible
limitations of the model. Although we focus
on establishing and building cognitive
legitimacy through the composition of the
NVT and advisory board, we acknowledge
other research shows an emerging
organization has other possible means for
improving its legitimacy (e.g. Zimmerman
and Zeitz, 2002; Elfring & Hulsink, 2003).
Empirical research is needed to test the
propositions in our model and to determine
whether these relationships generalize
beyond
high
growth
emerging
organizations. However, the objective of
this study involves refining and extending
existing models and insights.
We
encourage future research to test the
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eigenvector score indicates the focal actor is
connected to well-connected “others”,
whereas someone that is connected to
“isolates” would have a low eigenvector
score even if he or she had a high degree
centrality score (Borgatti, 1995). High
average eigenvector centrality of NVT and
advisory boards indicates high prestige.
The proposed model applies to high growth,
emerging
organizations
created
by
innovator entrepreneurs. Therefore, the
sample needed to test the proposed model
needs to capture entrepreneurs who pursue
competency destroying innovations in the
earliest stages of organization formation.
Researchers
may
identify
these
organizations using the suggestions
presented by Katz and Gartner (1988). Data
regarding the novelty of the venture idea
and prestige may be obtained using
information typically provided in a business
plan, whereas cognitive legitimacy may be
captured
by
surveying
potential
stakeholders of the emerging organizations.

propositions presented and develop theory
that extends them.
Testing the propositions presented in this
article requires operationalization of
cognitive legitimacy, novelty of venture
idea, and prestige. Aldrich and Fiol (1994)
argue that cognitive legitimacy can be
assessed by measuring the level of public
knowledge about a new activity. Consistent
with Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), we
consider cognitive legitimacy as a
continuous variable ranging from zero to
very high levels of legitimacy, not as a
dichotomous variable where emerging
organizations either have legitimacy or do
not.
Cognitive
legitimacy
requires
measurement of the extent of stakeholders’
awareness of the emerging organization’s
product, organization, and management
team (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2003;
Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Stakeholders could
be asked to rate the level of knowledge
regarding these three dimensions. The
novelty of venture idea has been assessed
by having researchers rate the level of
innovativeness and then determining interrater reliability (e.g. Shepherd & Detienne,
2005, Amason et al., 2006). The method
appears to adequately measure novelty of
venture ideas and could be used in testing
the proposed model.

CONCLUSION
Emerging organizations need to establish
legitimacy to acquire resources necessary
for survival. However, few researchers
have addressed how emerging organizations
build legitimacy, more specifically,
cognitive legitimacy. Many factors impact
emerging organizations’ ability to survive
(e.g., environmental and industry forces),
but we chose to focus on factors within the
control of the entrepreneur at the very
beginning of the life cycle of an emerging
organization. Researchers have noted that,
“the entrepreneurial team is a relatively
controllable entity. “If well understood, the
process of team formation could be shaped
to enhance ventures’ chances of success”
(Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn &
Sapienza, 2006: 226). The choices of NVT
and advisory board members impact how

Prestige has been measured in a number of
studies regarding boards of directors (e.g.
Certo, 2003, Lester, Certo, Dalton, Dalton,
& Cannella, 2006), yet further work is
required to adapt these measures to NVT
and advisory boards. Similar to Dimov and
colleagues (2007), research could measure
prestige using centrality measures common
in social network studies. Eigenvector
centrality is used when the status (i.e.,
prestige) of an actor is a function of the
status of those with which he or she is
connected (Bonacich, 1972).
A high
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Athaide, G.A., Meyers, P.W., Wilemon,
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1996.
Seller-buyer
interactions
during
the
commercialization of technological
process innovations. The Journal
of
Product
Innovation
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stakeholders perceive the emerging
organization. Relationships among NVT
prestige, advisory board prestige, and
cognitive legitimacy merit study since
educators advise entrepreneurs to form
NVTs and advisory boards but do not
discuss effective strategies for their
formation or explain how they may impact
survival in the earliest stages of the
organizational life cycle. Research on
advisory boards, such as investigating the
model proposed here, has clear implications
for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs could
benefit greatly from knowing more about
how to effectively create and use NVTs and
advisory boards to establish cognitive
legitimacy.
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